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There have been dramatic swings in the fortunes of communal politics in Bangladesh. 
In the 1940s the swing of a large part of the Bengali Muslim middle classes and rich 
peasants to the Pakistan movement played a critical role in the creation of Pakistan. 
Shortly afterwards, the equally dramatic swing of a large part of these same classes 
away from their commitment to an Islamic identity led eventually to the breakup of 
Pakistan in 1971. Thus recent Bangladeshi history provides examples of the victory of 
both “communalism” and “secularism” in quick succession. Given this history, it is 
surprising that Bangladesh's attempts to define itself as a nation has not played a 
much greater role in the analysis of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent.  
 
At the very least the Bangladesh debacle should have led to fundamental questions 
being raised about the validity of the two-nation theory in what remained of Pakistan. 
But not only has the Pakistani version of the two-nation theory survived, new attempts 
have been made in India to define nationhood in religious terms. The re-writing of 
history that this has involved has been strongly contested by progressive Indian 
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historians, including amongst others, Irfan Habib (for instance see Habib 1999). 
Despite these challenges, one reason why many in India passively acquiesced with the 
Hindutva experiment may be that it was seen as a route through which national unity 
could be achieved in a country whose internal divisions seemed to be preventing 
political stability and economic development. In this context, the experience of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh in constructing their national identities raises serious 
questions about the viability of such a project. 
 
Bangladesh was the result of two successive carve-ups, the first based on the 
communal ideology of the two-nation theory and the second based on its rejection in 
favour of linguistic nationalism. The product was a landmass with significantly 
greater linguistic and religious homogeneity compared to the other major 
subcontinental countries. Yet far from creating a stable state and a society with a clear 
sense of national identity, Bangladesh continues to be riven by conflict and dissent 
over what constitutes the fundamentals of its nationhood. While some forms of ethnic 
and communal conflict have indeed become muted as a result of the physical absence 
of some obvious “others”, there is no evidence that overall political stability has 
increased. New political disputes over nationhood have simply replaced old ones.  
 
What has driven the emergence of competing conceptions of nationhood in 
Bangladesh, and why have none of the answers provided greater political stability to 
the country? Apart from ideological and cultural aspirations, economic interests have 
been central in Bangladesh as elsewhere in driving groups to define the “nation” and 
of course to define themselves as its representatives. To the extent that economic 
interests drove nationalism in Bangladesh, we have to explain why a series of 
“nationalist victories” did not result in a coherent ruling class emerging that could 
enforce political stability.  
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A number of possible explanations have been suggested in the literature. First, there is 
a Marxist- inspired literature that has explained nationalist conflicts in terms of 
underlying class conflicts. The problem this literature has to address is the following. 
While the underlying class conflicts have been relatively clear-cut, for instance 
between peasants and landlords or between capitalists and workers, the nationalist 
struggles they ostensibly generated were conflicts between more amorphous 
coalitions of classes. The eventual conflicts have been between factions composed of 
various classes, led by members of “intermediate classes” such as the petty 
bourgeoisie and rich peasants. Moreover, the most significant beneficiaries of these 
conflicts were not peasants or workers (even when the factions they predominantly 
supported won) but small groups from within the intermediate classes. The Marxist 
literature has responded by explaining these features in terms of leaders from the 
intermediate classes exploiting broader class grievances for their own ends (for 
instance, Umar 1980a; 1980b; Rahman & Azad 1990; Hashmi 1994). This does seem 
to explain why both capitalist accumulation and the real incomes of workers and poor 
peasants have often suffered following these conflicts.  
 
However, a weakness in the simplistic Marxist analysis is that too much depends on 
the susceptibility of the masses to “false consciousness”. What enables the political 
leadership to exploit class grievances and exploitation in this way, not just once or 
even twice in a single generation but repeatedly? Secondly, while political 
entrepreneurs from these intermediate classes have clearly dominated politics in 
Bangladesh, these entrepreneurs have not represented the class interests of their own 
class once they get to power. The rich peasant or petty bourgeois politician who 
represents their class interest systematically is the exception rather than the rule. More 
typically, political leaders have represented factional interests, usually with very 
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negative effects for economic growth. 
 
The role of factions is central to a second set of explanations that draws on the 
Weberian sociological tradition. In Bangladesh, as elsewhere in the Indian 
subcontinent, political action has not normally been organized by class organizations 
even though class conflicts have been intense in different periods. Rather, political 
conflicts have predominantly been between rival multi-class factions. The approach 
adopted by sociologists in the Weberian tradition has focussed on the role of patron-
client networks and patrimonialism in defining political agendas (for instance Khan, 
Islam and Haque 1996). This approach suggests that charismatic and arbitrary leaders 
control the “neo-patrimonial” state in Bangladesh. The competition between factions 
headed by charismatic leaders with different ideological agendas explains the intense 
political instability that we observe.  
 
The problem with this approach is that while national conflicts have clearly been 
dominated by competing patron-client networks, this patron-client approach is 
divorced from an analysis of the economic interests of the participants. It does not 
explain why patron-client networks have been able to exercise such power and have 
been able to define the contours of major social conflicts. In Weber's original story, 
charismatic leaders were able to play such a role in pre-modern societies because they 
enjoyed traditional legitimacy. It is difficult to argue that modern Bangladeshi leaders 
have enjoyed such a tradition-based legitimacy. Rather, their limited and fragile 
legitimacy has been conditional on the economic benefits they have offered their 
followers. 
 
Finally, a neoclassical analysis based on the work of Douglass North and others in the 
New Institutional tradition suggests that the problem of instability in Bangladesh may 
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be due to the absence of strong collective identities at the grass roots level (A. A. 
Khan 1996). The distance of eastern Bengal from invading armies from western India 
and the easy availability of flood-plain irrigation are some of the characteristics 
explaining weak collective action in village Bengal. The instability we observe today 
is explained in terms of this history. Once again, this type of analysis identifies some 
characteristics of Bangladesh's social organization that are real enough. But the 
neoclassical approach does not explain why class-based identities continue to remain 
weak even though the payoffs for solving collective action problems are now very 
large. More importantly, it does not explain why alternative forms of collective 
action, particularly in the destructive form of factional politics are so deep-rooted. It is 
not that all collective action is absent since collective action of some types is deeply 
entrenched. 
 
The approach in this essay combines the class analysis of the Marxist approaches with 
an analysis of why in the specific class context of Bangladesh a particular type of 
patron-client activity predominates. An explanatory framework based entirely on class 
or one based entirely on patron-client networks misses the interdependence between 
class interests, primitive accumulation and patron-client networks which we need to 
explore. It is possible to explain the rapid changes in the ideological orientation of the 
leading political parties and leaders in Bangladesh in terms of material interests but 
only if we understand how these material interests have been refracted through the 
redistributive interests of factions. At the same time, the dominance of factional 
interests has to be explained with reference to specific processes of class transition 
going on in the broader society. This transition is one of state- led primitive 
accumulation that has generated intense political competition for control of the state. 
This in turn has created irresistible short-term incentives for upwardly mobile groups 
to collectively organize into competing factions. The leaders of factions have been 
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able to play a pivotal role in the economic process precisely because primitive 
accumulation and politically determined surplus allocation has placed a high premium 
on groups or individuals with superior organizational abilities. The dominance of 
factional organizations can make sense in such a class context. Factional competition 
can, in turn, help to explain the rapid and frequent shifts in the ideological affiliations 
of the ruling coalitions. This is not to deny that strongly-felt values and notions of 
identity do motivate individuals in society. However, if parties were mainly 
responding to deeply felt political values, it would be hard to explain the swings in 
support for competing parties and even more so, the continuous swings in the 
professed values of political leaders and their supporters.  
 
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections. Section 1 provides an 
outline of the cycles in the ideological orientation of the ruling groups in Bangladesh. 
The shifts in orientation have occurred both at the level of parties and factions, but 
more dramatically, also at the level of individuals who have frequently changed their 
positions. This brief description identifies our problem. Section 2 looks at some of the 
features of party and factional organization and the role of the intermediate classes in 
providing leadership in this factional competition. Finally, Section 3 argues that the 
factional conflicts are in fact deeply rooted in processes of primitive accumulation. 
We argue that this creates strong incentives for a specific type of patron-client 
competition that can explain political instability and the dynamics behind the changes 
in nationalist ideologies observed in Bangladesh. This factional competition also has 
serious implications for economic performance, which we briefly touch on. 
 
1. Nationalist Ideologies and Politics in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh was carved out in the form of East Pakistan in 1947 as the outcome of a 
communal polarization in Bengal. The growth of communal politics in Bengal 
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happened relatively late but progressed very rapidly. It was several decades after 
modern political activities began in the early part of the twentieth century that both 
Hindu and Muslim political communities moved towards communal politics. Bengali 
Muslim politicians who had previously been organized in secular parties representing 
the emerging rich peasants of East Bengal began to ally themselves with the Muslim 
League in the mid-forties even though the Muslim League had never had a strong 
base in Bengal. At the same time the Bengal Congress which mobilized the 
predominantly Hindu middle class but also Hindu landlords and peasants became 
increasingly communal. The communal polarization of Bengal politics in the forties 
thus affected both communities and marked a sharp break with the secular politics of 
the early twentieth century. The rapid rise of the Muslim League culminated in its 
spectacular victory in the 1946 Bengal provincial elections. The League won 108 of 
the 117 Muslim seats; in no other Muslim majority province was its victory so 
complete (Hashmi 1994; Kabir, M.G. 1995: 30-121). 
 
However, the disappearance of the Muslim League from East Bengal politics was 
equally rapid and dramatic. In 1949, barely two years after independence, Maulana 
Bhashani split the Muslim League by forming the Awami (People's) Muslim League. 
Ironically, although one of its main aims was to get Bengali recognized as a state 
language, the word Awami in its title was Urdu and not Bengali. Nevertheless, by the 
mid-fifties some of the same mainstream East Bengali politicians (like Suhrawardy) 
who had played a key role in the creation of Pakistan turned on their recent allies and 
began to assert a Bengali nationalist identity for East Pakistan. Indeed, a great many 
politicians who had till very recently been communal discovered that they were really 
secular. Under the leadership of Suhrawardy (Sheikh Mujib was still a minor player at 
that time) the Awami League and its allies wiped the Muslim League off the map in 
the 1954 elections. What is interesting is that the Awami League, which played a 
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central role in the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, was a 
direct offshoot of the Muslim League that created Pakistan in 1947 (M. G. Kabir 
1995: 122-182; Jahan 1994). 
 
However, the post-1971 experience is even more persuasive in forcing us to examine 
the roots of identity formation more seriously. Prior to 1971, it was possible to argue 
that the political instability in the country was driven by a search for national identity 
or by classes using national ideologies in their struggle against exploitation. We do 
not need to deny the importance of these factors to question whether they provide a 
sufficient explanation for the conflicts and crises of the past fifty years. If they did, the 
creation of Bangladesh through a truly decisive victory in 1971 for the side that stood 
for Bengali nationalism should have made an observable difference to political 
stability. But in fact, as soon as Bangladesh was created, the secular nationalism of 
the Awami League proved to be incapable of holding together the competing groups 
of Bengali politicians. Mujib himself did very little to institutionalize secularism, 
perhaps because he understood the dynamics of Bengali politics quite well. He and 
many others in his party re-discovered their Islamic roots and tried to outflank their 
opponents within the party by encouraging the defeated “Islamic” political forces 
while clamping down on the left. 
 
The history of the economic chaos under the Mujib regime, the growth in 
authoritarianism as the Bongobondhu constructed the apparatus of personal rule, and 
his eventual assassination by army officers (many of whom were ironically freedom 
fighters in the 1971 war) remains both painful and controversial in Bangladesh. 
Nevertheless, the attempt by many who are sympathetic to the secular ideals of his 
party to explain his fall as a conspiracy supported by foreign “anti- liberation” forces 
is too simplistic. For one thing, it ignores the fact that many of his assassins and their 
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supporters were freedom fighters who felt that Mujib had betrayed them. Secondly, 
the political parties which eventually emerged from the military regimes which 
succeeded Mujib continue to get significant numbers of votes, collectively at least as 
much as the secular parties. Most importantly, the conspiracy explanations ignore 
Mujib's own political manoeuvring that showed a high degree of flexibility in terms of 
his commitment to secularism.  
 
A few examples of this flexibility will have to suffice. Perhaps the most significant 
act was Mujib's decision in 1973 to release without trial or investigation the 33,000 
alleged war criminals who sympathized with, or were members of, Islamist parties. 
Shortly afterwards, in 1974, Mujib travelled to Pakistan to attend the Islamic Summit 
held at Lahore and returned home proudly proclaiming Bangladesh to be the world’s 
second largest Islamic nation (Kabir, B.M. 1988: 83-84). In the same year a Madrasah 
Education Commission was formed to advise on how religious education could be 
improved. In 1975 Mujib set up the Islamic Foundation to promote Islamic studies 
and to manage mosques (Murshid 1996: 362-3; Kabir, M.G. 1995: 188-190). Even in 
terms of the narrow definition of secularism in the new constitution, some of these 
moves, at least, were suspect. 
 
The Awami League’s defence of Islamic sensibilities was exemplified by the Daud 
Haidar case of 1974. Daud Haidar was a poet who wrote a poem that was deemed 
blasphemous. The Awami League participated in identifying him as an atheist and 
communist and he was forced to leave the country. Bhuiyan Monowar Kabir has 
provided a district- level account of the Pabna Awami League organization leading the 
mobilization against Daud Haidar in alliance with the recently pardoned Jamaat 
supporters in a bid to isolate the “left” factions in local politics (Kabir, B.M. 1988: 
85). 
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Whether Mujib and the Awami League were right or wrong to do these things is not 
our question. We only wish to contrast Mujib’s conciliatory stance towards the groups 
who supported an Islamic identity so soon after a bloody conflict against them with 
his stance towards groups within his own ostensibly socialist party who were 
increasingly identifying themselves as the “left”. While the general pardon of 
November 1973 was being implemented to release “Islamist” supporters from prison, 
no supporter of a left-wing party, of whom many thousands were in prison at that 
time, was released. We can conclude that Mujib and his supporters did not feel that 
the practice of Islam damaged the economic interests that they represented. Since the 
ostensibly secular Awami League had recently won a decisive victory, it would not 
have sacrificed its interests so readily if there really was a material conflict of interest 
with Islam.  
 
To clarify what we mean by this, it will be useful to contrast the secularism of the 
Awami League with the mobilization against the Catholic Church during Europe's 
Reformation. The conflict between the Church and secular social forces during the 
Reformation is rightly recognized as one of the defining moments in Europe's 
transition to modernity. But in Europe, the Church was blocking the material interests 
of the classes that would lead the industrial revolution. This probably explains why 
their opposition was implacable until the church had been significantly reformed 
(Tawney 1938 is still an excellent analysis of this conflict). 
 
The specific features of the Reformation differed from country to country in Western 
Europe but some broad features were shared in common. Productive capitalist classes 
were emerging based on long-distance trade, and at the same time, states were being 
constructed that could exercise territorial jurisdictions within which capitalism could 
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grow. The declining social forces were those based on landed property, the wealth of 
the Church and the political ambitions of a Church-based empire. They constituted a 
social coalition opposed to these changes. As a result, there were relatively sharp 
economic conflicts between monarchs, the Church and emerging capitalists over their 
material interests that put the Church on one side and a collection of progressive 
economic forces on the other. 
 
The most obvious economic conflict between reforming monarchs and the Church 
was over the vast amounts of land owned by the Church. These assets not only 
reduced the access of the monarch to revenues but also created a powerful competing 
political force, often allied to Rome, which could prevent the centralization of 
political authority in the state. Secondly, there was a conflict between merchants and 
the Church over the theological acceptability of income from usury in Christianity. 
Here capitalist accumulation which was driving productivity growth faced obstacles 
from a pre-capitalist Church-based system of maintaining social order using notions 
of justice which were no longer appropriate. Finally, there was a conflict between 
Church and state over their respective jurisdictions when it came to appoint officers to 
lucrative administrative and judicial positions. In this case too, territorially defined 
emerging modern states faced competition from a parallel set of jurisdictions 
organized around the Church. Thus the economic interests underlying the ideological 
conflict between Church and secular social forces were based on radically different 
ways of organizing production. This is why religion and secularism represented 
conflicting class interests in Reformation Europe. This in turn ensured that the victory 
of one side or the other would have economic consequences for the mode of 
organizing production in Western Europe over a period of several centuries.  
 
The emerging economic supremacy of the secular interests that challenged the Church 
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during the Reformation resulted in accelerated economic growth and this ensured that 
political practice eventually became more or less secular across Western Europe. This 
is despite the fact that in many European countries, including England, the formal 
constitutional separation of Church and state has not emerged to this day. The 
Western European story is important because the theoretical association of secular 
movements with the liberal bourgeoisie and therefore with social progress is based on 
a reading of this history.  
 
The political economy of religion in contemporary developing countries is somewhat 
different. In the Indian subcontinent neither Hinduism nor Islam had an organized 
church with massive land-holdings along the European pattern either in pre-colonial 
or colonial times, or indeed subsequently. Nor has there been any ongoing 
competition between “church” and state over their respective jurisdictions in 
appointing office-holders along the European pattern. The weakness of religious 
control meant that rules about usury could be ignored altogether, or evaded through 
profit-sharing as in contemporary Pakistan. This meant that the restrictions on usury 
in Islam did not lead to intense conflicts between emerging merchant- financiers and 
the “church”. In independent Pakistan or Bangladesh, the merchant and capitalist 
classes have certainly not felt threatened by the anti-capitalism implicit in the Islamic 
ban on usury. Similarly, while some aspects of Hinduism, such as the caste system, 
appear to be anti-capitalist, emerging Hindu traders and capitalists have not felt 
threatened by these and have certainly not been in the forefront of secular movements 
in India. 
 
Mujib's flexibility in the early seventies is easier to comprehend if we recognize that 
the Awami League and its opponents were in fact mobilizing groups within the same 
set of classes for whom the practice of Islam or secularism did not have a direct 
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material significance. Nevertheless the regime's choices did have an economic 
significance in the sense that the ruling coalition was searching for allies at the lowest 
cost. We can see a materialist logic in these concessions in terms of Mujib’s search 
for a critical minimum group to sustain his hold on power. In the aftermath of 
independence, it was cheaper for the ruling group to acquire allies from amongst the 
defeated Islamist groups rather than from within the left. The left was growing in 
mobilizing ability, and its leaders could therefore have demanded much bigger 
payoffs for their allegiance. 
 
If Mujib had feared that his faction might begin to fracture, he was certainly right. 
Bengali politicians who had just months ago been united in their allegiance to Bengali 
nationalism now began to divide on other issues. A large group left the Awami 
League under the banner of socialism to set up a new socialist party. The socialist 
credentials of the new Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dol (JSD) were, however, fairly suspect 
given that a number of their key leaders later joined military governments. The 
breakdown of unity within the ruling group was so precipitous, and the effects so 
destructive for the economy, that Mujib responded with draconian but ultimately 
futile measures. He relied increasingly on a para-military force answerable directly to 
him (the Jatiyo Rokkhi Bahini or JRB), amended the constitution to introduce a 
presidential form of government, and finally instituted a one-party state. Despite these 
measures political stability collapsed, crime and violence soared, and partly as a 
consequence, the state was unable to respond (and was certainly perceived to have 
failed to respond) to the famine of 1974-5 in a satisfactory manner. This was the 
prelude to Mujib's assassination and military rule.  
 
Mujib's assassination in 1975 was followed by two decades of governments which 
tried to construct a new political unity around the notion of a Bangladeshi, for which 
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read Bengali Muslim, identity for the nation. The military governments, which 
succeeded Mujib, and the civilian parties they created, were also full of paradoxes. 
They absorbed many defectors from the Awami League, who saw no contradiction in 
adopting the new Bangladeshi identity, and they also attracted old Maoists like Kazi 
Zafar and JSD socialists like Abdur Rab who argued that the developmental agenda of 
the military was more in tune with socialism. Constitutional changes were introduced 
which recognized the privileged status of Islam but they stopped short of declaring 
Bangladesh an Islamic Republic. The secular agenda, to the extent that it was ever 
implemented, was correspondingly attenuated. Yet no stability was to emerge. 
 
By the end of the eighties the main lines of ideological conflict were drawn between 
the Bangladeshi nationalist BNP (the Bangladesh Nationalist Party set up by General 
Zia) and the Bengali nationalist Awami League. Yet, the two joined forces in the late 
eighties in their fight against the ruling Jatiyo Party of Ershad that was ideologically 
indistinguishable from the BNP. In the early nineties, an even more unholy alliance 
emerged between the secular Awami League and the Islamist Jamaat against the then-
ruling BNP government. Inevitably, over this period the Awami League’s secular 
claims became much more muted. By this stage it had become difficult to identify any 
important issues of concrete political practice affecting secularism on which the three 
major parties actually differed. Compare, for instance, the very similar record of BNP 
and Awami League governments in the nineties in banning books offending Islamic 
sensibilities.  
 
Despite the convergence in practice, the conflict between the Bengali nationalism of 
the Awami League and the Bangladeshi nationalism of their rivals has emerged as a 
new focus of ideological differentiation and conflict. The rather obscure distinction 
between the two is in itself interesting. Bengali nationalism is supposed to be the 
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nationalism of the Bengali people, and Bangladeshi nationalism, the nationalism of 
the Bangladeshi people. A substantial number of Bengalis live in the Indian state of 
West Bengal and most of them are not Muslims. Bengali nationalism stresses the 
shared linguistic culture of the two Bengals. On the other hand, Bangladeshi 
nationalism celebrates the Muslim-Bengali culture of East Bengal and points out the 
specifically Islamic practices that define social life in Bangladesh. Since this is a 
political dispute, we are entitled to ask what the political implications of the two 
nationalist philosophies are. 
 
Historically, political conflicts between competing traditions of nationalism have been 
conflicts over the boundaries of the nation-state. One might have thought that Bengali 
nationalism, appealing to Bengalis as a whole, would challenge the existing borders of 
both India and Bangladesh. If it did, there would indeed be a significant difference in 
the political implications of the two ideologies. But in fact, the supporters of Bengali 
nationalism in Bangladesh, and in particular the Awami League, have no intention of 
forming or joining an actual nation-state with the West Bengalis. Thus, in terms of the 
implications for sovereignty or the boundaries of the state, the nationalist debate in 
Bangladesh is of no consequence. It is as if Chinese nationalists in Taiwan ruled out 
unification with China but yet wanted to distinguish themselves from Taiwanese 
nationalists. Instead the object in the Bangladeshi conflict now seems to be to 
mobilize mutually exclusive groups who can only be differentiated according to their 
professed cultural preferences (which occasionally change). This latest phase in the 
conflict over nationalism in Bangladesh is important because it is no longer possible 
to sustain the argument that fundamental questions of sovereignty are driving the 
ideological debate. On the contrary, the political process seems to be keeping alive an 
issue that has ceased to have any meaning for most people. 
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Why do obscure debates about the culture of the country get misrepresented as 
conflicts over nationalism and manage to dominate conflicts in the political arena? 
Clearly there are passionately felt differences between Bangladeshis about how they 
would like to see themselves but these preferences do not have material implications 
for most people nor do they have political implications for sovereignty. At most, the 
competing nationalisms may have implications for the degree to which secularism is 
observed, but even here, the practice of the competing parties shows little substantial 
difference. All this suggests that taking the substance of the political disputes too 
seriously, whether secularism or nationalism, may be missing the point. There are 
clearly deep economic conflicts, and ideology plays a part in defining the competing 
parties, but the disputes are not really over the ideologies. Rather, the logic behind 
defining and re-defining one's “nationalist” camp seems to be to contest the ruling 
coalition if one is in opposition, or to sustain the ruling coalition at least cost, if one is 
in power. 
 
2. Parties, Factions and the Intermediate Classes 
A number of features of the political competition in Bangladesh can help to explain 
the rapidly changing but sustained ideological conflicts described in the last section. 
Most observers will readily recognize these features, but to establish them as typical 
would require a much fuller historical and sociological discussion than we will 
attempt. Instead, we will only point out two key features that we believe are 
important. First, we note that political parties are multi-class organizations that bring 
together a large number of patron-client networks in a pyramidal structure. Secondly, 
members of the “intermediate” classes dominate the organizational leadership of these 
factions. The implications of these characteristics are discussed in the next section. 
 
The observation that political parties in Bangladesh are multi-class factional 
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organizations is not in itself controversial in terms of the descriptions found in the 
Bangladeshi literature. It is widely noted, for instance, that the major parties in 
Bangladesh represent quite similar multi-class interests, that they routinely split and 
re-form along factions led by strong personalities, and that these factions are 
themselves loose coalitions of smaller or primary factions which are to be found at all 
levels of society (see, for instance, Khan, Islam & Haque 1996; S.A. Khan 1989; 
Siddiqui 1984; Riaz 1994; Wood 1994: 31-99). But recognizing this process raises an 
obvious question that deserves analytical attention. Why is it that formal organized 
politics has been dominated by the conflicts between these multi-class patron-client 
factions rather than by the conflict between classes which clearly also exist?  
 
Looking from the bottom up, the basic component of any party or coalition, however 
large, is a myriad of basic patron-client factions. Each of these is organized around a 
single or small group of leaders. These basic patron-client factions are ubiquitous and 
range from neighbourhood groups led by petty mafia bosses known in Bangladesh as 
mastans to village factions led by somewhat more respectable matabbars, dalals and 
upazilla chairmen. Looking from the top down, factions at lower levels are too small 
to wield any real bargaining power vis-a-vis factions organized at higher levels or vis-
a-vis the state. Bargaining power depends on the number of people who can be 
occasionally mobilized by the faction for elections but more generally for maintaining 
local level enforcement networks, organizing civil protests, demonstrations, enforcing 
general strikes, and other forms of activity which aim to inflict costs on those who 
refuse to make deals or offer payoffs to that faction.  
 
Since bargaining power is greater when the faction is bigger, there is a strong 
incentive for coalitions of factions to start coalescing in a pyramidal fashion. The 
more serious the conflict, the bigger the coalition that will form to fight it, with the 
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payoffs from victory being distributed in varying proportions down the pyramid. 
Higher- level faction leaders deal with lower level faction leaders, adding or removing 
them as conditions change. At the same time, lower level faction leaders join or exit 
from the coalition depending on what they are being offered by the coalition 
compared to others. The leader of the Awami League, for instance, is the leader of a 
relatively small number of factions at the highest level, but if we follow each of these 
factions down the pyramid, a vast number of factions will be found at the lowest 
levels. 
 
The ubiquity and often vagueness of the notion of the faction in the Indian 
subcontinent has led some to question its usefulness (Hardiman 1982). Interestingly, 
the Bengali word for faction, dol, is the same word that now means party. But is 
Hardiman right to question all analysis that focuses on the faction? First, he argues 
that not all political leaders operate through factions. Some are activists who directly 
engage in agitational (for which we can read class) politics. The existence of such 
exceptional individuals does not, of course, preclude the usefulness of the notion of 
faction if we observe, as we do, that many important political issues are contested 
between factions.  
 
A second critique is that higher- level leaders are often observed to fail in forcing their 
decisions on lower level clients. This too does not rule out the importance of factions, 
it simply says that the bargaining power between patrons and clients within factions 
can vary greatly. Not only is this true, the rapid formation and dissolution of big 
coalitions testifies to the ability of lower level clients to opt out of the coalition as 
conditions change or as better offers are made by competing coalitions.  
 
A more significant criticism offered by Hardiman is that clients often have strong 
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class organizations of their own which can over-ride their loyalties to their patrons. 
This criticism is really directed against those who present faction and class as 
mutually exclusive categories such that collective action is only of one type or the 
other. Hardiman's critique of factional analysis that ignores class entirely is totally 
justified. But individuals can and do operate within both class and factional 
organizations, we have to explain why the most important political battles in the past 
century have been between factional organizations. 
 
Finally, Hardiman points out that there is little evidence of factions operating at the 
national level with tentacles spreading right down to the village. He reviews the 
classic works on factions by F.G. Bailey, Ralph Nicholas and Paul Brass amongst 
others to show that their work does not support the claim that the day-to-day operation 
of village factions is dominated by loyalty to patrons outside the village. This 
criticism is levelled against an anthropological notion of faction based on loyalty. If 
factions were indeed based on loyalty networks then a faction once established would 
be fairly immutable and we would see traces of its existence even when no immediate 
conflicts were going on. However, we would argue that most factions and factional 
alliances are rationally made pragmatic alliances based on what the lower level 
faction can offer the higher level one and vice versa. The coalition that would form 
during an election would be different from the coalition that would form during a land 
dispute.  
 
Shakeeb Adnan Khan (1989) provides an account of the operation of village-level 
factions in Bangladesh from a Marxist perspective. He describes in rich detail how 
patron-client factions compete vigorously at the village level for access to state 
distributed resources like irrigation pumps or Food for Works contracts, or to settle 
land disputes where mobilizations of rival forces by the contestants plays a critical 
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role. Successful patrons not only have to be more successful in organizing locally, 
they also have to be successful in forging flexible alignments with parties and factions 
at higher levels controlling the state. The clients of village patrons, the small and 
middle peasants who benefit from the resources which village- level patrons can 
distribute, are not only not perturbed by their patrons changing their party allegiances 
as power shifts in Dhaka, they expect them to do so (S.A. Khan 1989: 91-125). Thus 
here too, Hardiman's critique is relevant but only when directed against analysts for 
whom factions are based on pre-rational loyalties to caste or kin. Such factions are 
very rare, and as we have seen, coalitions which are constructed on the basis of 
apparently primordial loyalties such as religion rapidly break down once their 
immediate objectives have been achieved. The experience of caste-based coalitions in 
India has been very similar. 
 
The second point which is worthy of note is that not only are factions ubiquitous, they 
are organized and led by political organizers who typically come from the 
“intermediate” classes. Factions are very rarely led by capitalists and almost never by 
workers, the landless or poor peasants. Classes that occupy an intermediate position in 
society, often collectively described as the intermediate classes, dominate factional 
leadership positions. The term was popularized by Kalecki (1972) who noted that the 
urban petty bourgeoisie, rich peasants and state bureaucrats politically dominated 
post-independence India. Our use of the term differs somewhat from Kalecki. We 
include a broader group of classes in the category, which we treat as a residual to 
describe classes that are not capitalist, working class (including the unemployed) or 
poor peasant (who are at, or close to, subsistence levels). Nor do we want to say, like 
Kalecki, that these classes have some shared interest in non-capitalist development 
that the intermediate regime promotes. Rather, our intention in identifying these 
classes is simply to point out that the polar classes do not dominate organizational 
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politics. On the other hand, the intermediate classes too do not act as classes. They 
simply provide tens of thousands of recruits for leading and organizing factional 
politics at different levels of society. The economic policies the state follows cannot 
simply be read off from this fact, and here we differ from Kalecki. The tension 
between the redistributive demands coming from factional politics and the imperative 
of ensuring economic growth largely through the capitalist sector has resulted in sharp 
shifts in state policy. The state has sometimes followed dramatically pro-capitalist 
policies, and at other times (as in the early seventies) it has almost destroyed 
capitalism (see M.H. Khan 1989; 1999). 
 
Our broader definition of the intermediate classes includes rich peasants, middle 
peasants, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the educated “middle class”, both employed 
professionals and the educated unemployed. While these classes have different 
interests, it is not surprising that they should have collectively provided a significant 
proportion of the political entrepreneurs of recent history.  Compared to workers, poor 
peasants and the illiterate unemployed, they have a relatively high degree of 
organizational ability based on their relatively high levels of education and wealth. 
Secondly, though still a relatively small fraction of the population, they are far more 
numerous than capitalists and large landlords whose numbers are insignificant in 
developing countries like Bangladesh, and who therefore do not play a central 
organizational role in politics. Nor is capitalism so developed that the capitalist class 
can dominate politics indirectly by exercising their purchasing power. The important 
point is that while political entrepreneurs from the intermediate classes play a key role 
in political organization, it is not the case that the intermediate classes dominate the 
political scene as classes. 
 
Thus the political dominance of the intermediate classes reflects the incomplete 
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transition to capitalism. Bangladesh suffers from this incomplete transition to a higher 
degree than many other parts of the Indian subcontinent. Industrial capitalism was 
virtually non-existent in Eastern Bengal in the colonial period. Nevertheless, the 
growth of administrative employment, the professions and the prospect of political 
liberalization in the late colonial period opened up growing factional conflicts led by 
the intermediate classes. Rich and middle peasants in East Bengal had enjoyed a 
period of prosperity based on commercial agriculture in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century and provided political leaders for the contest over the state 
apparatus. The prize was the control over state sector jobs and resources and this was 
the beginning of the first of the mass mobilizations we came across in the last section 
(Chatterjee 1982; Goswami 1982). 
 
The disposition of classes in contemporary Bangladesh demonstrates the continuing 
importance of the intermediate classes. Most of Bangladesh still lives in rural areas 
even though the share actually employed in agriculture has been rapidly falling. Even 
in 1970, the share of the population in urban areas was only 6%, rising to around 20% 
in the late nineties (Hossain 1996: Table 3.1). In agriculture, even though 
accumulation and growth of the market economy have generated tendencies towards 
land concentration in some areas, these have not been strong enough to over-ride 
countervailing tendencies. First, there has been a dramatic population explosion in the 
second half of the twentieth century with the population increasing from around 40 
million in 1950 to more than 120 million today. Muslim inheritance laws ensured 
substantial land fragmentation as a result. Secondly, investment in politics has often 
been more attractive than investment in land and indeed necessary to protect land 
already owned. As a result, the rural rich have often invested in politics rather than in 
land beyond a point (S.A. Khan 1989: esp. 114-125). 
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Table 1 summarizes recent trends in landholding patterns. Economic differentiation 
and rapid population growth contributed to a rapid increase in landlessness till 
currently around 50% of rural households are functionally landless. Very similar 
pressures have also resulted in a dramatic growth in relatively small farms that have 
grown both in relative numbers and in terms of the share of total land they account 
for. The middle peasant category is relatively stable in importance. The total amount 
of land they control has not dramatically fallen, even though in relative terms, the 
number of farms in this category has declined. Large farms (which in Bangladesh is 
anything over 7.5 acres) have not been so successful. The total area controlled by 
large farms has declined (H.Z. Rahman 1998: 68-71). In fact, most large and middle 
farms in Bangladesh are really relatively small peasant farms by global standards, and 
their owners are in most cases members of the intermediate classes rather than 
capitalist farmers. Even though the landless and the subsistence farmers are 
numerically dominant, it is these middle and large peasants who dominate rural 
politics. 
Table 1. Landholding Structure and Landlessness in Bangladesh 
CATEGORY Percentage of Farms Percentage of Area 
 1977 1983-4 1995 1977 1983-4 1995 
Small Farms (-2.5 acres) 49.7 70.3 72.7 18.8 29.0 36.8 
Middle Farms (2.5-7.5 acres) 40.9 24.7 23.1 48.9 45.1 43.4 
Large Farms (7.5- acres) 9.4 4.9 4.0 32.4 25.9 20.7 
Functionally Landless: 0-0.5a 
(% of Rural Households) 
 56.0 50.0    
Source: H.Z. Rahman (1998) Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
 
The numerical dominance of the intermediate classes within the politically significant 
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urban groups is also clear. An extensive survey of households in Dhaka city in 1985 
(Siddiqui et. al. 1990) collected data from 4,500 households, or 1% of the total, based 
on the records of the Dhaka Municipal Corporation. This does not include illegal 
properties and slum dwellers and so workers and the unemployed are under-reported. 
Since we are interested in the classes that can potentially play a leading role in 
politics, the survey effectively gives us the numerical distribution within these classes. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the occupational structure reported. The preponderance of the 
intermediate classes can be seen from the first two rows. The first row reports 
professionals who are clearly part of the intermediate classes. The study does not 
specify the criterion according to which the household heads describe themselves as 
large, medium or small businessmen, but it is clear from the study that industrialists 
are large businessmen (Siddiqui et. al. 1990: 173-192). We conservatively assume that 
half of the medium businessmen and all the small businessmen are petty-bourgeois, 
that is shopkeepers, self-employed political entrepreneurs whose “business” is based 
on licenses to supply controlled commodities, and so on. This means that around two-
thirds of registered households belong to the intermediate classes, a proportion which 
is not surprising in the context of contemporary developing countries.  
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Table 2. Occupation of Heads of Households in Dhaka City 1985 
OCCUPATION % 
Professions with High and Intermediate Education (Doctors, Teachers, 
Lawyers, Government and Non-Government Service and Corporations) 
43.4 
Trade and Commerce 36.7 
  (Big Business) (4.9) 
  (Medium Business) (20.5) 
  (Small Business) (11.3) 
Occupations with Low Skills and Education (Rickshaw-pullers, Daily 
Labourers, Drivers, Technicians) 
12.5 
With no Employment (including housewives, students and retired) 7.4 
Source: Siddiqui et. al. (1990) Table 21. 
 
The registered households in the formal sector of the economy are often the ones that 
play a leading role in domestic politics. The pivotal leadership role played by the 
intermediate classes is even more pronounced when we look at the membership of 
political parties. Khan, Islam and Haque (1996) provide a survey of 355 political 
leaders carried out in 1990/91. They surveyed leaders at different levels of political 
parties across the entire range of the political spectrum. Of the respondents, 63% 
reported an income less than 10,000 taka (around 200 dollars) and almost 90% had an 
income less than 20,000 taka (400 dollars) a month (Khan, Islam & Haque 1996: 
Table 5.12). Even by the standards of the Bangladeshi capitalists and upper middle 
class professionals, these are low incomes. In terms of their own class description, 
66% described themselves as lower-middle class, 33% as middle class, and only 1% 
as upper class (Table 5.17). 
 
Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that in contrast to Bardhan’s model for India 
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(Bardhan 1984), the political competition over resources in Bangladesh (and, we 
would argue, in India too) is not organized primarily between industrial capitalists, 
professionals and landlords organized as classes, but rather between competing multi-
class factions led at each level by political entrepreneurs from the “intermediate 
classes”. Far from rejecting the importance of class, we would argue that it is 
important to explain why members of different classes actually behave in this way. 
 
3. Primitive Accumulation and the Intermediate Classes 
The dominance of intermediate class leaders and the prevalence of factional politics 
do not by themselves explain political instability or the ideological conflicts that we 
have outlined earlier. To proceed further, we have to look at the nature of “primitive 
accumulation” in countries like Bangladesh and the distributive conflicts unleashed by 
this process. Primitive accumulation is accumulation which is not based on capitalist 
production but which is essential for the capitalist transition since it provides the 
initial resources for the creation of capitalist property and for setting up capitalist 
enterprises. Essentially, it describes the transfer of resources from non-capitalist to 
capitalist sectors. In the context of the transition to capitalism in England, primitive 
accumulation involved theft, the enclosure of common lands, colonial plunder, 
unequal exchange, the protection of markets and the fiscal mechanism (Marx 1979: 
873-940). The role of the state can be critical during this period because all these 
processes “employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of 
society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode 
of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition” (Marx 1979: 915-
16). 
 
Irfan Habib pointed out that primitive accumulation can be a protracted process and 
moreover, it does not necessarily lead to a successful capitalist transition. For 
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instance, the primitive accumulation organized by the British in India created a 
proletarian class by destroying handicrafts but did not create a significant Indian 
capitalism because the resources appropriated were largely invested in Britain (Habib 
1995: 271-295). While today a capitalist sector exists in pockets all over the Indian 
subcontinent, processes that are very similar to the primitive accumulation described 
by Marx still continue, though in modern variants.  
 
If we look at Bangladesh, the viability of the emerging capitalist sector in industry has 
been critically dependent on state-organized transfers of resources from consumers 
and non-capitalist sectors through taxes, exchange rates and tariffs protecting 
emerging industries (Norbye 1990; M.H. Khan 1989; 1999). In addition, vast amounts 
of public resources have been channelled to emerging “capitalists” as loans from 
state-owned banks. These loans funded almost the entire investment in large-scale 
industry in the seventies and eighties. The immediate source of these resources was 
international capitalism, since the state-owned banks in turn borrowed from bilateral 
and multilateral agencies. But to the extent that the loans will eventually be called, 
and most of the “capitalists” have no intention of repaying (see Sobhan 1991 for 
estimates of the “debt default”), they amount to a transfer from taxpayers and 
consumers in non-capitalist sectors. Other mechanisms which have been important in 
the past have included overvalued exchange rates which notoriously transferred 
resources from jute-growing East Pakistani peasants to emerging industrialists in 
West Pakistan.  
 
Whether we want to call these processes primitive accumulation or give them a new 
name is not important. What is important is that there are analytical similarities 
between these modern processes and the enclosures and colonial plunder invo lved in 
earlier transitions. The modern processes are somewhat less violent and more 
 
28 
sophisticated fiscal and financial mechanisms are involved. But as before, the growth 
of capitalism is linked to redistributive transfers of resources from other sectors. 
Secondly, as before, contemporary primitive accumulation does not have to result in 
successful capitalist transitions. In the case of Bangladesh, certainly, much of the 
transfers have been wasted and a vigorous capitalism is yet to emerge. There are 
many other conditions that are necessary for capitalist transitions to be successful. 
The Brenner debates pointed out the importance of pre-existing class structures in the 
transitions in Europe (Aston & Philpin 1987). Khan & Jomo (2000) discuss some of 
the features of successful and unsuccessful transitions in a comparative Asian 
perspective.  
 
The role of factional politics and of patron-client networks in developing countries 
have to be understood in this context. Since the capitalist sector by definition does not 
yet dominate the economy, it is not surprising that explicitly pro-capitalist parties do 
not dominate politics. As a result, redistributions to emerging capitalists (whether or 
not they eventually turn out to be productive) are typically only a small part of the 
overall redistributions taking place in society. If redistributions were limited to 
emerging capitalists alone, there would undoubtedly be substantial political 
opposition. This should not be interpreted in a functionalist sense to imply that 
redistribution to non-capitalist factions take place to purchase political stability for 
capitalist primitive accumulation. Rather, emerging capitalists and non-capitalist 
political entrepreneurs jointly compete for resources through their factions. Some of 
the most successful political entrepreneurs may themselves make a transition to trade 
and industry, or they may divert resources to industrialists in exchange for kickbacks. 
 
It is easy to see why emerging capitalists cannot seize state power to organize 
redistribution to themselves alone. Big businessmen in urban areas are less than 5% of 
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the politically significant urban households (see Table 2). Moreover, only a very small 
part of these households are actually large industrialists. The number of significant 
industrialists who have benefited from state-sponsored primitive accumulation 
probably numbers in the hundreds at most. This is a minuscule proportion of 
registered urban households. Similarly, in rural areas, the landowners who are direct 
beneficiaries of state policies in the form of getting loans for tube-wells, or lucrative 
construction contracts, or licenses to distribute controlled commodities are inevitably 
a minuscule proportion of the huge number of peasant households in the rich to 
middle categories (Table 1). 
 
On the other hand, the size of the intermediate classes also precludes social-
democratic transfers to the intermediate classes collectively. In a very poor country, if 
30 to 40% of the population who belong to the intermediate classes have to be 
accommodated with significant transfers, this would present impossible fiscal 
burdens. Thus even when populist parties have controlled the state, policies of 
redistribution to the intermediate classes as a whole have not been tried. The transfers 
we observe are not to the intermediate classes as a whole but to factions that succeed 
in winning particular political contests. The accumulation strategies of upwardly 
mobile members of the intermediate classes, and indeed some of the shifts in their 
ideological positions can be better understood in this context. 
 
If we remember that the main characteristic of the period of primitive accumulation is 
the contestability of property rights and state-sponsored redistributions of resources, it 
is possible to make materialist sense of the persistence of some types of factional 
politics in countries where the intermediate classes dominate. There are tremendous 
incentives for capitalists and non-capitalists alike to belong to political groupings that 
can capture or protect assets, licenses, subsidies, jobs, and indeed any valuable 
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resource. Since organizational ability is the key and there is a vast pool of 
intermediate classes providing this ability, there is a proliferation of groups at all 
levels engaged in the creation and resolution of conflict.  
 
Success in redistributive contests depends on each faction being able to field more 
organizational power than its rivals. This is as true of the lowest level factions 
fighting over disputed land in villages as of national level factions competing for 
control of the state. The national factions are, of course, constructed out of primary 
factions. If they are successful, members of the intermediate classes in leadership 
positions at different levels of the faction can become quite well off and may make a 
transition to the asset owning class. These payoffs for the faction can take the form of 
licenses, loans from state banks, and the control over local state organs such as the 
police that allows land grabbing or jobs in public sector enterprises, to give just a few 
examples. 
 
The ability of any particular primary faction to get included at any level of the much 
bigger factions competing for state power depends on its perceived ability to deliver 
organizational power at least cost for the higher leadership. The organizational power 
of a faction depends on its ability to field its supporters, from mobilizing them for 
local elections to bringing them out to impose costs on opponents, in many cases 
through organized violence. At each level including the highest, leaders want to have 
the maximum number of the most powerful factions under them, but not without 
limit, because the more factions they incorporate, the more thinly will they have to 
distribute the resources they eventually hope to capture. This ensures that factions 
never become truly encompassing, and when they do become too big they start to 
rapidly fragment. 
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Primary factions can be excluded if the leadership of a higher level faction feels that 
the economic cost of including it is too high for achieving its redistributive agenda or, 
(if the higher level faction already has access to resources), the political cost of 
excluding the lower level group is acceptable. The strategy of excluded groups in turn 
is to shift their political positions from being simply troublesome to being totally 
incompatible with that of the ruling group depending on their assessment of whether 
accommodation is still possible or not. Sooner or later cracks also start appearing 
within the ruling coalition as some factions within the ruling coalition feel they are 
not getting their just deserts. These factions may start to leave the ruling group to join 
opposition coalitions and eventually the ruling coalition becomes unviable and is 
replaced. 
 
The sequence of such calculations results in a fairly systematic pattern at the national 
level over time. A national party that does not have access to state power seeks to 
attract primary factions to challenge the party in power. It does this by creating as 
much disruption as possible for the group that is currently in power to signal to 
unattached factions that it is a serious contestant. The purpose of this opposition is to 
achieve either incorporation by being offered an acceptable payoff or the overthrow of 
the party in power. At the same time, the faction in power seeks to stabilize its rule by 
forming a big enough coalition that incorporates some of the most troublesome groups 
and factions at least cost. The leaders of the party in power have to be skilful in 
shifting the focal point defining their ideological position to accommodate as many of 
the target groups as possible while differentiating itself from its opponents. The 
longer they can succeed in doing this, the longer they will survive and continue to 
benefit from direct access to political power which is critical for appropriating or 
protecting resources.  
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In reality there are small differences in the balance of classes that the different 
factions incorporate. Nevertheless it is surprising how much of the recent political and 
ideological conflicts can be explained simply in terms of redistributive conflicts 
between patron-client factions. We have seen for instance, that Mujib and the “left” 
united against the military regime in Pakistan in the late sixties, but the same Mujib 
decided to bypass the left and make overtures to the “right” in the early seventies. 
These moves are difficult to interpret if we associate secularism with class interests or 
even with strongly felt ideological commitments of the leadership. However, from a 
factional perspective, Mujib's moves make sense because his later concessions were 
precisely to those groups that could at most demand limited payoffs for the support 
they could offer. In contrast, concessions to factions that identified with left-wing 
symbols were increasingly more expensive as more and more factions re-aligned to 
the new focal point provided by the “socialist challenge” to the Awami League. 
 
There is, however, an important paradox that we must address. Why do the masses 
persistently collude in being “fooled” since this pattern of politics has been around 
long enough for everybody to realize what is going on? Even though the intermediate 
classes dominate in leadership positions, parties can only succeed if they can bring out 
mass support at critical times and, of course, at elections. The mass supporters of 
parties do not in the end get substantial economic payoffs or payoffs in the form of 
their preferred ideological positions being realized. Nevertheless there seems to be a 
widespread collusion in the acceptance of the meaningfulness of the claims made by 
parties, and alternative movements or parties that could in theory reflect mass 
aspirations better do not replace them. Two types of answer have been provided. The 
first comes from a narrowly defined class analysis and the second from a neo-
Weberian analysis of the patrimonial state, but neither is satisfactory on its own. 
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The conventional class approach, exemplified in Bangladesh by the work of 
Badruddin Umar (1980a; 1980b) identifies class conflicts between conventional 
classes such as capitalists, landlords, workers and peasants as the key determinants of 
the underlying conflicts over resources. Hashmi (1994) and Rahman and Azad (1990) 
are other examples. These approaches point out that in the 1940s, the most important 
class conflict in Bengal was between the mainly Muslim peasantry and the mainly 
Hindu zamindars who were large absentee “landlords” who effectively only had 
residual rent collecting powers. In addition to the zamindar versus peasant conflict in 
Bengal, there were a number of secondary conflicts, such as that between the more 
advanced Hindu bourgeoisie and the emerging Muslim bourgeoisie in Western India, 
between the Muslim landowning classes of central India and the emerging dominance 
of the Hindu capitalist class, and finally the conflict between the more advanced 
Hindu professional middle class and the emerging Muslim middle class all over India. 
The conflict between the zamindars and peasants was undoubtedly the most important 
conflict for Bengal given the preponderance of the agrarian economy. As late as the 
1930s, the salience of this conflict was reflected in the growing ascendance of secular 
peasant parties such as the Krishok Proja Party.  But by the 1940s, class politics 
became communalized under the leadership of the emerging Muslim intermediate 
classes consisting in the main of rich peasants and urban professionals. These groups 
established their leadership by representing the class conflict as a communal one, a 
trick they could play because of the contingent religious composition of the relevant 
classes. 
 
In effect, authors such as Umar (1980a; 1980b), Hashmi (1994) and others in this 
category rely on either “false consciousness” or betrayal by the leadership to explain 
how the genuine grievances of the poor and middle peasants and of urban workers got 
translated into a political language and agenda which offered them little. 
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Nevertheless, this agenda did propel the middle classes from within the Muslim 
community into political power. Similarly, class conflict between Bengali workers 
and poor peasants and the largely West Pakistan-based industrial capitalists may have 
been behind the conflicts of the late sixties. While such explanations clearly have a 
factual description at their core, they are not fully satisfactory for several reasons. 
First, a false consciousness and/or betrayal explanation may have been convincing for 
the first mass mobilization of 1947 or even for the second one of 1971. But when we 
see the same pattern of ideologically based factions led by intermediate classes 
repeating itself again and again into the eighties and nineties, the false consciousness 
explanation gets stretched and we have to ask whether it was a sufficient explanation 
in the first place.  
 
As we noted in the last section, there seems to be a systematic readiness on the part of 
the poor to accept uncomplicated ideological dichotomies and to readily mobilize 
along these lines. Is this really based on false consciousness? When anyone has 
actually bothered to ask the poor about their opinions and beliefs there is very little 
evidence of false consciousness. Unfortunately, representative surveys do not exist for 
the earlier periods but increasingly such studies are being conducted to test popular 
perceptions. Banu (1992) is an example of a nation-wide survey of contemporary 
attitudes (quoted in Khan, Islam & Haque 1996: 14). In the eighties when the 
mainstream parties were once again fighting the secular versus Islamic battle, this 
survey found that only 6.4% of rural respondents were proud of national 
independence and only 1% of the War of Liberation, the most potent symbols of the 
commitment to secularism. At the same time, barely 9% of the respondents reported 
that they were proud of Islam. This hardly suggests the kind of deeply felt primordial 
commitments that could explain a century of strife. The mass of Bangladesh's 
working people seem to have little time for the fine ideological debates of the middle 
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classes, a fact which should hardly be surprising in itself. But it does leave 
unexplained the ability of parties and factions to mobilize the masses ostensibly on 
such issues rather than on the basis of the economic interests of the poor.  
 
Instead of false consciousness, it may be that individuals at the bottom of the pyramid 
behave as they do because what little they can potentially get through the success of 
their faction is greater than the expected payoffs from class action. The poor do get 
some benefits from factional politics although the benefits are pitifully small. They 
may range from the patron's offer of protection through the mobilization of the faction 
during disputes over land and resources, the offer of credit at less than usurious 
interest rates, or in the case of more active foot soldiers, a regular retainer. A rational 
rejection of class policies by the poor may be based on a number of considerations. 
First, there may be a justifiable perception that class action to change society is 
unlikely to succeed unless a very significant degree of class unity was to emerge. If 
the poor perceive that they are fragmented, and that the rich and the intermediate 
classes will most likely succeed in dividing them, then following class politics is 
irrational. The observed preference of the poor to support factional patrons rather than 
class organizations (S.A. Khan 1989; Jansen 1987) may then be based not on false 
consciousness but rather on a rational calculation about which strategy is likely to 
make any difference in the actual class context in which the poor find themselves. 
 
A more fundamental problem may be that the poor (and indeed their leaders) may not 
be able to visualize a credible change in the productive system that could make 
everyone who was poor better off. Like fragmentation, the absence of credible 
strategies to increase the size of the pie through inclusive class politics by the poor is 
not necessarily an unalterable fact. Nevertheless, in the absence of credible strategies 
to increase the size of the pie, upward mobility through the political process is a zero-
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sum game. There may then be a tradeoff between the size of the group one belongs to 
and the payoff one gets. More specifically, there may be an “inverse-U-shaped” 
relationship between the size of the group and the payoff. If the group is too small, its 
bargaining power is negligible and the payoff it gets is zero. If it is too big, involving 
for instance all the poor, the payoff is again very small because the payoff has to be 
widely distributed, given that no convincing programme exists for increasing 
production through class action. The typical patron-client faction may offer the best 
payoff to the individual poor person, providing that he or she succeeds in selecting a 
winning faction. Be longing to a faction and participating in this type of politics may 
then be attractive given the very limited alternatives as perceived by the poor 
themselves. 
 
This conclusion is most compelling when we look at contemporary Bangladesh 
politics when the ideological conflicts have become more and more bizarre from the 
perspective of the poor but have not failed to attract supporters to the mass parties. 
But it may also be worth questioning earlier history. For instance, was the conversion 
of the Bengal peasants to the idea of a “Muslim utopia” in 1946  (as described in 
Hashmi 1994) really based on false consciousness? Apparently irrational choices (in 
the sense that they seem to go against the interests of those making them) can actually 
be rational decisions even when they are collectively self-defeating. 
 
Our materialist analysis of patron-client politics can also explain another apparent 
paradox. Twice in the last fifty years in East Bengal, massive political victories were 
followed by the virtually immediate disintegration of the winning party. The Muslim 
League, which won a landslide in Bengal in 1946, fell apart in East Pakistan in a 
matter of months and lost the 1954 provincial elections to the secular United Front, 
never to recover (M. G. Kabir 1995: 122-139). In much the same way, the Awami 
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League, which won a landslide victory in East Pakistan in 1969, began to disintegrate 
in Bangladesh within months of independence. The rapid fragmentation of the ruling 
coalition led to Mujib's disastrous experiment with a one-party state and presidential 
authoritarianism and eventually to his downfall in 1975 (M. G. Kabir 1995: 183-195). 
 
An important aspect, at least, of this type of political disintegration can be explained 
in terms of the economic logic of factional competition. The paradox of success is that 
when an opposition faction is too successful in attracting primary factions to itself, it 
faces a problem. It can win, but in victory it will not have sufficient resources to 
satisfy all the aspirants who have joined as faction leaders. In East Bengal in 1947, 
and then in East Pakistan in 1971, the problem was even more dramatic. The 
coincidence of communal or ethnic identities with factional ones meant that in 1947 
the defeated factions preferred to leave the country and in 1971 they were forced to 
leave. The object of the opposition in both cases had been to claim some of the 
resources previously monopolised by the faction in power. Their victory on the basis 
of a massive coalition combined with the departure of a substantial part of the group 
from which redistribution could have been claimed proved to be disastrous for the 
victorious on both occasions.  
 
A materialist explanation of the instability created by factional politics needs to be 
distinguished from the patron-client analysis in the Weberian tradition. For Weber 
too, pre-capitalist societies were characterized by variants of patron-client 
relationships, but for very different reasons. Weber contrasted the “rational” 
bureaucratic form of governance seen in modern capitalism with traditional forms of 
authority in pre-capitalist societies. Patrimonial rule was identified as one of the most 
important of these pre-capitalist forms of governance, where allegiance to a leader is 
based on personal loyalty and traditional legitimacy (Weber 1978: 1006-1110). 
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Instability in this framework is explained by the importance in patrimonial societies of 
the “charisma” of the leader. Changes in leadership can then lead to far-reaching 
changes in social policy as long as the leader remains within the bounds of traditional 
legitimacy. 
 
While Weber has inspired contemporary sociologists to look for authority exercised 
through personalized patron-client networks, we would argue that the patron-client 
networks we observe in the Indian subcontinent are not based on traditional 
legitimacy. On the contrary, the “contract” between patrons and clients in 
contemporary developing countries is often surprisingly modern and rational. It is 
based on an exchange of organizational muscle for material benefits and is readily re-
negotiated if clients (or indeed entire factions) are offered better terms by other 
patrons or higher- level factions. 
 
Weber's analysis is also different because of its underlying analysis of the economic 
implications of patrimonialism. What interests Weber is the arbitrary and 
unpredictable nature of patrimonial rule, which he contrasts with the formal and 
predictable nature of bureaucratic rule. Capitalism, he argues, requires the rule-
governed predictability of bureaucratic governance. The arbitrariness of 
patrimonialism stifles capitalism by lowering investment and preventing long-term 
planning by capitalists and encourages patrimonial rulers to arbitrarily favour their 
clients by granting them monopolies. Since this description has an uncanny 
resemblance to the “crony capitalism” observed in many developing countries, 
Weber's analysis of patrimonialism has informed a new interest in the deleterious 
effects of patron-client networks in developing countries. 
 
Despite its apparent relevance, Weber's analysis is misleading because it conflates the 
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functional requirements of advanced capitalism with the requirements of the period of 
transition during which capitalism is being created and institutionalized in developing 
countries. No capitalist country organized this process of transition by first instituting 
a rational bureaucracy. The process of transition has always been arbitrary, unjust and 
dominated by political interventions that are by their nature not impersonal. The  
analysis of this process is not our intention here, nor in making this observation are 
we suggesting that all arbitrary and unjust processes of transition lead to successful 
capitalist transitions. Rather, one of the challenges for political economy is to analyse 
why in some countries, the balance of class forces and patterns of patron-client 
exchanges were conducive for rapid transitions to capitalism while in others the 
transition was blocked. 
 
In Bangladesh, and in the Indian subcontinent more generally, the transition to 
capitalism has been relatively slow. This is not unrelated to the type of patron-client 
networks that have dominated the political competition in these countries (Khan 
1996). The strength of the intermediate classes in the Indian subcontinent relative to 
emerging capitalists and the state has meant that the competition over redistribution 
has been relatively intense. This has not only resulted in a relatively large loss of 
investible surplus to unproductive activities (in the way suggested by Bardhan 1984) 
but also and more seriously, to a perennial political instability that has prevented the 
process of primitive accumulation leading to accelerated capitalist growth. In the 
Bangladesh example, the effects of this intense factional competition combined with 
slow growth has been cycles of political instability, often interspersed with military 
dictatorships, but even the latter have not succeeded in clamping down on the 
organization of political competition for resources by factions.  
 
The real irony has been that the dominance of the intermediate classes and their 
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factional politics slowed down the transition to capitalism in the Indian subcontinent, 
thereby ensuring the persistence of factional competition. This underlines the 
importance of combining an analysis of factionalism with an analysis of class. We 
have argued elsewhere that patron-client networks in other developing countries 
where the distribution of organizational power between classes was different often 
had less damaging effects for the capitalist transition (M.H. Khan 1989; Khan & Jomo 
2000).  
 
Finally, our analysis of the political economy of instability can also be contrasted with 
the New Institutional explanation of collective action failure offered by A.A. Khan 
(1996). In this essentially neoclassical approach, the absence of corporate solidarity in 
contemporary rural Bangladesh has been explained by the low payoffs to collective 
action historically, due to the peculiarities of its ecology and defence needs. The 
relatively easy availability of water and the great distance of East Bengal from the 
centres of Indian empires made collective action at the village or even higher levels of 
East Bengal society less compelling. There is very probably a certain amount of truth 
in this claim but the analysis is also quite misleading.  
 
First, in modern Bangladesh there is a substantial amount of collective action, but this 
collective action is not organized along class lines and the effects of this collective 
action have usually been quite regressive for economic development. We have 
explained the specific types of collective action in Bangladesh not in terms of ecology 
and geography but in terms of the balance of class forces and the incentives created 
by primitive accumulation. Secondly, Bangladesh is not really that unique any more 
within the broader context of the Indian subcontinent despite its unique ecology and 
geography. The political instability and factional politics we see in Bangladesh will 
not be unfamiliar to someone from Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh or Pakistani Punjab. 
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While there are important differences in the details of class and social organization 
across the Indian subcontinent, the broad similarities in the organizational 
predominance of the intermediate classes and the processes of primitive accumulation 
have ground out quite a surprising similarity in the political and economic processes 
across the subcontinent. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the intense factional conflict over resources observed in 
Bangladesh makes sense if we understand the context of contestable property rights 
and state-sponsored redistribution which we have described as primitive 
accumulation, together with a class context where a huge amount of organizational 
ability exists to lead factions. Tragically, although the factional conflict has never 
been about the substance of religious or secular practice, the politicization of religion 
has had dire consequences. Communal politics has immediate and disastrous effects 
for minorities. Our analysis warns us that the roots of the communal problem are 
deeper than prejudice and that secular forces are not necessarily significantly different 
in their economic motivations from communal ones. This argument is supported by 
the fact that in Bangladesh it has made little difference for the economy or for the 
subordinate classes when factions professing to be “progressive”, “socialist” or 
“secular” have come to power in the post-1971 period. 
 
We have argued that the most consistent way of explaining conflicts over nationhood 
is to see them as an outcome of deeper processes of accumulation and 
accommodation. The ideologies which can serve as focal points at each stage in the 
contest for included and excluded groups are obviously defined by the range of values 
and symbols inherited from the past. Nevertheless, what is interesting for us is the 
way in which groups have been very flexible in adopting and rejecting labels to align 
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themselves with or against dominant coalitions at different stages in the political 
cycle. What is also interesting about these changes is that the ideological identities of 
the groups in and out of power did not in general directly reflect the material interests 
of competing classes. Secularism, for instance, was not the ideology of an emerging 
capitalist class which felt its interests were constrained by religious injunctions or 
“church” institutions. Instead secularism and socialism, together with Islam and other 
ideologies have reflected material interests indirectly. The economic role of 
ideologies has been to consolidate and distinguish shifting groups of primary factions 
in parties competing over resources in a context of primitive accumulation.  
 
In making this point we have, of course, deliberately simplified and exaggerated our 
case. For many individuals who support political movements, beliefs in particular 
values are strongly felt. Nevertheless, we would argue that these individuals, most 
often intellectuals, have not been in the driving seat in deciding the agenda or the 
policy interventions of the dominant parties. There are differences in the precise mix 
of classes supporting the different parties but this cannot be read off in any simple 
way from their ideological banners. 
 
Finally, while our argument has primarily been about Bangladesh, a similar fracturing 
of political identities is happening more slowly in India and Pakistan. What is 
interesting about the Bangladesh experience is that it shows how political fracturing 
can happen even in a relatively homogenous region of the Indian subcontinent where 
the bulk of the politically active population is not divided by language, religion or 
caste. It is much easier in such a context to examine the economic imperatives which 
may be persuading competing factions to look for identities. While an economic 
explanation does not detract from the importance of an analysis of culture and 
ideology, it suggests that the roots of the political instability facing the Indian 
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subcontinent may lie in the accumulation strategies of upwardly mobile groups using 
a variety of ideological symbols to differentiate themselves from competing groups.  
 
If economic motivations have driven ideological conflict and fragmentation, this 
clearly has implications for attempts to resolve the problem of instability in the Indian 
subcontinent by looking for new, more or less inclusive, “national” identities. Our 
argument suggests that these attempts are unlikely to succeed as long as the factional 
competition unleashed by the weak property rights and state-engineered redistribution 
during primitive accumulation is not addressed. This point is forcefully established 
when we examine the Bangladesh experience, where political stability was not 
achieved even though two partitions led to the creation of a relatively homogenous 
country in 1971 with an apparently coherent national identity. 
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